The Crisis of Germany's Pension Insurance System and How It Can Be Resolved

Hans-Werner Sinn

No 7304, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The paper discusses the options for a reform of the German pension system using a model developed at CES for the German Council of economic advisors to the Federal Ministry of Economics and Research. It is argued that the German pay-as-you-go-system is efficient in a present value sense but will nevertheless need the support of a funded system to avoid a financial crisis. The paper investigates the possibility of introducing obligatory private savings at a variable rate where the time path of the savings rate is chosen so as to stabilize the sum of this rate and the pay-as-you-go contribution rate, given the time path of pensions as defined in the present system.

JEL-codes: H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ias and nep-pub
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Cnossen, Sijbren and Hans-Werner Sinn (eds.) Public finance and public policy in the new century, CESifo Seminar Series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2003.

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Crisis of Germany's Pension Insurance system and How it Can be Resolved (1999)
Working Paper: The Crisis of Germany's Pension Insurance System and How It Can Be Resolved (1999)
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