Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?
Michael Dooley
No 7531, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Recent financial crises in emerging markets have been followed by temporary but substantial losses in output. This paper explores the possibility that threats of such losses are the dominant incentive for repayment of international debt. In this environment private debtors and creditors have strong incentives to design international contracts so that renegotiation is costly. Such contracts generate dead weight losses and proposals for reform of the international monetary system that modify explicit and implicit contractual arrangements and can be welfare improving under special circumstances. However, such proposals might also weaken the incentives that make private international debt possible.
JEL-codes: F15 F2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn and nep-mon
Note: IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (88)
Published as Dooley, Michael P. "International Financial Architecture And Strategic Default: Can Financial Crises Be Less Painful?," Carnegic-Rochester Conference Series on Public PolicyP, 2000, v53(1), 361-377.
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