Can Monopoly Unionism Explain Publicly Induced Retirement?

Casey Mulligan

No 7680, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: It has long been suggested that trade unions take actions and favor public policies that reduce the quantity of labor so that union members might enjoy greater labor incomes. Can this explain the prevalence of generous public pension programs inducing retirement? I suggest not, by formalizing the monopoly unionism model and showing how labor's interest in reducing the quantity of labor cannot explain why the old are induced to retire rather than discouraging work among workers of all ages. Discouraging work of a subset of union workers introduces allocative inefficiencies without promoting the objectives of the monopoly union. And, unless the old have a disproportionate influence within the union, union interests cannot explain why public pension programs are so generous.

JEL-codes: J26 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-pub
Note: AG EFG LS PE
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