Games for Central Bankers: Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions

Alessandra Casella

No 8026, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper questions the link between the establishment of a common currency among several countries and the necessity of political coordination. It begins by discussing why conducting a single monetary policy is thought to be easier within a single political unit. It then proceeds to enquire whether market mechanisms could be used to choose optimally the common policy of heterogenous actors, and thus provide an alternative to political decision-making. The advantage of market mechanisms is that they are transparent, predictable, and usually more efficient. In particular, the paper studies a simple game through which national representatives could choose the monetary policy of a single, multinational central bank. There are no fundamental logical objections or impossible practical obstacles to such market games, and even if they are rejected in principle they are useful in suggesting desirable amendments to traditional voting schemes.

JEL-codes: F33 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Games for Central Bankers: Markets vs. Politics in Public Policy Decisions (2000)
Working Paper: Games for Central Bankers, Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions (2000)
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