A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal - Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided

Dennis Carlton

No 8105, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper analyzes the question: When should a single firm have a duty to deal with another? The paper uses a series of economic models to answer the question, assuming the goal is to prevent harm to competition, and applies the economic analysis to the leading cases to show when antitrust enforcement is appropriate and when it is not. The analysis shows that, to prevent harm to competition, the role for antitrust should be quite limited and that two leading cases, Aspen and Kodak, represent a dangerous direction for antitrust policy.

JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-02
Note: IO
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published as Reprinted in e-Commerce Antitrust & Trade Practices, Practicing Law Institute, 2001.
Published as “A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal -- Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided,” Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 68, Issue 3, 2001. pp. 659-83.

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