Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin

No 8145, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent. Meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement, coordinate on jointly profitable actions, ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating, and determine whether cheating had occurred. In contrast to established theories, cheating did occur, but sparked only limited retaliation, partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents.

JEL-codes: L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03
Note: IO
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (130)

Published as Genesove, David and Wallace P. Mullin. "Rules, Communication, And Collusion: Narrative Evidence From The Sugar Institute Case," American Economic Review, 2001, v91(3,Jun), 379-398.

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Journal Article: Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case (2001)
Working Paper: Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case (2001)
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