Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form

Leslie Eldenburg, Benjamin Hermalin, Michael Weisbach and Marta Wosinska

No 8201, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies the governance of a sample of California hospitals. We document a number of empirical relations about hospital governance: The composition of the board of directors varies systematically across ownership types; poor performance and low levels of uncompensated care increase board turnover, with this sensitivity varying by organizational type. Poor performance, high administrative costs, and high uncompensated care lead to higher CEO turnover, with these effects again varying across different organizational types. Overall, these results are consistent with the view that boards of directors of hospitals of different organizational forms are substantially different, and that these boards make decisions to maximize different objective functions.

JEL-codes: G3 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff and nep-hea
Note: CF EH
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Eldenburg, Leslie, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach, and Marta Wosinska. “Hospital Governance, Performance Objectives, and Organizational Form." Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (September 2004): 527-548.

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