Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?

Torsten Persson ()

No 8214, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic eects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. And results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such eect are indeed present in international panel data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare-state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events is clearly institution-dependent, as is the timing and nature of the electoral cycle.

JEL-codes: D7 E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (57)

Published as Persson, Torsten. "Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy," Econometrica, 2002, v70(3,May), 883-905.

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