Financial Contracting

Oliver Hart

No 8285, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

JEL-codes: D2 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-fin and nep-pke
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (152)

Published as Hart, Oliver. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, v39(4,Dec), 1070-1100.

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Journal Article: Financial Contracting (2001)
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