Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment
Kala Krishna (),
Ling Hui Tan () and
No 8796, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper models investment/entry decisions in a competitive industry that is subject to a quantity control on an input for production. The quantity control is implemented by auctioning licenses for the restricted input. The paper shows that liberalizing the quantity control could reduce investment in the industry under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the level of investment is quite different when licenses are tradable than when they are not. Key factors in the comparison include the elasticity of demand for the final good and the degree of input substitutability. Two examples are computed to illustrate the results.
JEL-codes: F3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as Kala Krishna & Ling Hui Tan & Ram Ranjan, 2004. "Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), article 8, pages 1206-1206.
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Journal Article: Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment (2004)
Working Paper: Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment (2001)
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