Property Rights and Finance

Simon Johnson, John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff

No 8852, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

JEL-codes: D23 P23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent and nep-mfd
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (462)

Published as Johnson, Simon, John McMillan and Christoher Woodruff. "Property Rights And Finance," American Economic Review, 2002, v92(5,Dec), 1335-1356.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8852.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Property Rights and Finance (2007)
Journal Article: Property Rights and Finance (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8852

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8852

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().