The Curley Effect

Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer

No 8942, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. Boston as a consequence stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of the Curley effect, in which inefficient redistributive policies are sought not by interest groups protecting their rents, but by incumbent politicians trying to shape the electorate through emigration of their opponents or reinforcement of class identities. The model sheds light on ethnic politics in the United States and abroad, as well as on class politics in many countries including Britain.

JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Glaeser, Edward L. and Andrei Shleifer. "The Curley Effect: The Economics Of Shaping The Electorate," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2005, v21(1,Apr), 1-19.

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Working Paper: The Curley Effect (2002)
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