Taxes and Entrepreneurial Activity: Theory and Evidence for the U.S
Roger Gordon and
Julie Cullen
No 9015, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Entrepreneurial activity is presumed to generate important spillovers, potentially justifying tax subsidies. How does the tax law affect individual incentives? How much of an impact has it had in practice? We first show theoretically that taxes can affect the incentives to be an entrepreneur due simply to differences in tax rates on business vs. wage and salary income, due to differences in the tax treatment of losses vs. profits through a progressive rate structure and through the option to incorporate, and due to risk-sharing with the government. We then provide empirical evidence using U.S. individual tax return data that these aspects of the tax law have had large effects on actual behavior.
JEL-codes: H2 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ent, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: CF PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)
Published as Cullen, Julie Berry and Roger H. Gordon. “Taxes and entrepreneurial risk-taking: theory and evidence for the U.S." Journal of Public Economics 9, 7 (2007): 1479-505.
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