Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement

Patrick Kehoe and Fabrizio Perri

No 9077, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given. The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries.

JEL-codes: D5 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
Note: EFG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Kehoe, Patrick J. and Fabrizio Perri. "Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement," Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, v119(1,Nov), 184-206.

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Journal Article: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement (2004)
Working Paper: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement (2003)
Working Paper: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement (2002)
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