Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?
Ronald Ehrenberg,
Randy A. Ehrenberg,
Christopher Smith and
Liang Zhang
No 9088, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Our paper analyzes historical data for New York State on the percentagee of school budget proposals that are defeated each year and panel data that we have collected on budget vote success for indvidual school districts in the state. We find that changes in state aid matter, but not as much as one might expect. Defeating a budget proposal in one year neither increases nor decreases the likelihood that voters will defeat a proposal the next year. Districts whose school board members have longer terms have lower probabilities of having their budget proposals defeated. Finally, measures of school district educational and financial performance do not appear to influence budget vote outcomes.
JEL-codes: H4 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Citations:
Published as Ehrenberg, Ronald G., RAndy A. Ehrenberg, Christopher L. Smith, and Liang Zhang. "Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail?" Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 26, 2 (2004): 111-125.
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Working Paper: Why Do School District Budget Referenda Fail? (2004) 
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