A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default and Credit

Andrew Rose and Mark Spiegel

No 9285, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: One reason why countries service their external debts is the fear that default might lead to shrinkage of international trade. If so, then creditors should systematically lend more to countries with which they share closer trade links. We develop a simple theoretical model to capture this intuition, then test and corroborate this idea.

JEL-codes: F15 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (80)

Published as Andrew K. Rose & Mark M. Spiegel, 2004. "A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default, and Credit," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(s1), pages 50-63, June.

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default, and Credit (2004)
Working Paper: A gravity model of sovereign lending: trade, default and credit (2002)
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