Corporate Governance and Control

Patrick Bolton, Marco Becht and Alisa Röell

No 9371, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of corporate control, discuss the main legal and regulatory institutions in different countries, and examine the comparative corporate governance literature. A fundamental dilemma of corporate governance emerges from this overview: regulation of large shareholder intervention may provide better protection to small shareholders; but such regulations may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse.

JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (123)

Published as Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109 Elsevier.

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