Dynastic Management

Francesco Caselli and Nicola Gennaioli

No 9442, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is typical of family-owned firms. It is pervasive around the World, but especially in developing countries. We argue that dynastic management is a potential source of inefficiency: if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision making, meritocracy fails. We present a simple model that studies the macreconomic causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset-market imperfections, on the economy's saving rate, and on the degree of inheritability of talent across generations. We therefore introduce novel channels through which financial-market failures and saving rates affect aggregate total factor productivity. Numerical simulations suggest that dynastic management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in productivity.

JEL-codes: E1 E2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
Note: AP EFG
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Published as Caselli, Francesco and Nicola Gennaioli. "Dynastic Management." Journal of the European Economic Association 3, 2-3 (April/May 2005): 679-689.
Published as Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, 2013. "Dynastic Management," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 971-996, 01.

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Related works:
Journal Article: DYNASTIC MANAGEMENT (2013)
Working Paper: Dynastic Management (2006)
Working Paper: Dynastic management (2006)
Working Paper: Dynastic Management (2003)
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