Letting States do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation

Hilary Sigman

No 9451, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Under most U.S. environmental regulations, the federal government shares responsibility with the states by authorizing them to implement and enforce federal policies. Authorization provides states with considerable discretion over the effects of regulation and is perhaps the most significant decentralization in U.S. environmental policy. However, few studies address its role. To fill this gap, this paper explores the empirical determinants of authorization for water pollution and hazardous waste regulation. Although no single hypothesis strongly explains authorization, I find some evidence that states authorize to increase the stringency of regulation, which suggests that environmental decentralization would be beneficial.

JEL-codes: H77 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

Published as Sigman, Hilary. "Letting States Do The Dirty Work: State Responsibility For Federal Environmental Regulation," National Tax Journal, 2003, v56(1,Mar), 107-122.

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Journal Article: Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation (2003)
Working Paper: Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation (2002)
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