Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares

William Goetzmann, Matthew Spiegel and Andrey Ukhov

No 9469, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the date, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount

JEL-codes: F3 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
Note: AP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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