The Economics of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives
Magnus Blomstrom and
Ari Kokko
No 9489, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
This paper suggests that the use of investment incentives focusing exclusively on foreign firms, although motivated in some cases from a theoretical point of view, is generally not an efficient way to raise national welfare. The main reason is that the strongest theoretical motive for financial subsidies to inward FDI spillovers of foreign technology and skills to local industry is not an automatic consequence of foreign investment. The potential spillover benefits are realized only if local firms have the ability and motivation to invest in absorbing foreign technologies and skills. To motivate subsidization of foreign investment, it is therefore necessary, at the same time, to support learning and investment in local firms as well.
JEL-codes: J23 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn
Note: ITI
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (271)
Published as Herrmann, Heinz and Robert Lipsey (eds.) Foreign direct investment in the real and financial sector of industrial countries. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 2003.
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Working Paper: The Economics of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives (2003) 
Working Paper: The Economics of Foreign Direct Investment Incentives (2003)
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