Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets

David Weil

No 9565, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Implementation of workplace policies--whether through enforcement of laws or administration of programs--raises the question of the interaction between institutions created to carry out laws and the activities of workplace based agents that directly (e.g. unions) or indirectly (e.g. insurance companies) represent the interests of workers. This paper argues that there are two distinctive roles required for agents in the implementation of workplace policies. First, the agent must somehow help solve the public goods problem inherent in workplace regulation. Second, the agent must be able to reduce the marginal cost of exercising rights conferred to workers that are an important feature of most regulatory programs. This article examines these issues in regard to implementing workplace policies in the U.S. and analyzes the comparative effectiveness of different workplace agents- from labor unions to alternative dispute resolution systems- in fulfilling these roles.

JEL-codes: J58 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03
Note: LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Individual Rights and Collective Agents. The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets , David Weil. in Emerging Labor Market Institutions for the Twenty-First Century , Freeman, Hersch, and Mishel. 2005

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