Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice

Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell ()

No 9622, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In Fairness versus Welfare, we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed based entirely on their effects on individuals' well-being. This thesis implies that no independent weight should be accorded to notions of fairness (other than many purely distributive notions). We support our thesis in three ways: by demonstrating how notions of fairness perversely reduce welfare, indeed, sometimes everyone's well-being; by revealing numerous other deficiencies in the notions, including their lack of sound rationales; and by providing an account of notions of fairness that explains their intuitive appeal in a manner that reinforces the conclusion that they should not be treated as independent principles in policy assessment. In this essay, we discuss these three themes and comment on issues raised by Richard Craswell, Lewis Kornhauser, and Jeremy Waldron.

JEL-codes: D63 H43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-ltv
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Published as Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell. "Reply: Notes On Welfarist Versus Deontological Principles," Economics and Philosophy, 20(1): 209-215, April 2004
Published as Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell. "Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice," Journal of Legal Studies, 32(1): 331-362, January 2003

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