EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition

Bronwyn Hall, Stuart Graham () and Dietmar Harhoff ()

No 9731, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The recent surge in U.S. patenting and expansion of patentable subject matter has increased patent office backlogs and raised concerns that in some cases patents of insufficient quality or with inadequate search of prior art are being issued. At the same time patent litigation and its costs are rising. This paper explores the potential of a post-grant review process modeled on the European opposition system to improve patent quality, reveal overlooked prior art, and reduce subsequent litigation. We argue that the welfare gains to such a system may be substantial.

JEL-codes: K41 L00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-law
Date: 2003-05
Note: IO PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (13) Track citations by RSS feed

Published as Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition , Bronwyn H. Hall, Stuart Graham, Dietmar Harhoff, David C. Mowery. in Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4 , Jaffe, Lerner, and Stern. 2004

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9731.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition (2003) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9731

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9731

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2018-09-12
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9731