Choosing (and reneging on) exchange rate regimes

Alberto Alesina and Alexander Wagner

No 9809, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We use data on announced and actual exchange rate arrangements to ask which countries follow de facto regimes different from their de iure ones, that is, do not do what they say. Our results suggest that countries with poor institutional quality have difficulty in maintaining pegging and abandon it more often. In contrast, countries with relatively good institutions display fear of floating, i.e. they manage more than announced, perhaps to signal their differences from those countries incapable of maintaining promises of monetary stability.

JEL-codes: F3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-rmg
Note: EFG IFM ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Published as Alberto Alesina & Alexander F. Wagner, 2006. "Choosing (and Reneging on) Exchange Rate Regimes," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(4), pages 770-799, 06.

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Working Paper: Choosing (And Reneging On) Exchange Rate Regimes (2003)
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