Online Auctions and Digital Marketing Agencies

Francesco Decarolis and Gabriele Rovigatti

No 17-08, Working Papers from NET Institute

Abstract: We present an empirical investigation of the role of marketing agencies in Google’s online ad auctions. By combining data on advertisers’ affiliation to marketing agencies with data on bidding in ad auctions, we analyze how changes in the concentration of clients in the same industry under the same ad network are associated with changes in keyword bidding in terms of entry, exit, and pricing strategies. Moreover, by exploiting the case of a recent merger between agencies, we estimate through a difference-in-differences strategy that an increase in concentration leads to reduction in the average cost-per-click of the keywords affected by the merger.

Keywords: Online Advertising; Internet Auctions; Marketing Agency; Ad Network; Agency Trading Desk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-mkt and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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