Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods

Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gaechter ()
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Simon Gaechter: School of Economics, University of Nottingham
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter

No 2006-01, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a novel test as to whether there are "types" of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear-cut evidence for the existence of "types". People who express free rider preferences show the most systematic deviation from the predicted contributions, because they contribute in the first half of the experiment. We also show that the interaction of heterogeneous types explains a large part of the dynamics of free riding.

Keywords: Public goods games; experiments; voluntary contributions; conditional cooperation; free riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (66)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2006-01

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