Endogenous Move Structure and Volunatary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment

Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefton ()
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Martin Sefton: University of Nottingham

No 2010-14, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: In this paper we examine voluntary contributions to a public good, embedding Varian (1994)’s voluntary contribution game in extended games that allow players to choose the timing of their contributions. We show that predicted outcomes are sensitive to the structure of the extended game, and also to the extent to which players care about payoff inequalities. We then report a laboratory experiment based on these extended games. We find that behavior is similar in the two extended games: subjects avoid the detrimental move order of Varian’s model, where a person with a high value of the public good commits to a low contribution, and instead players tend to delay contributions. These results suggest that commitment opportunities may be less damaging to public good provision than previously thought.

Keywords: Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions; Sequential Contributions; Endogenous Timing; Action Commitment; Observable Delay; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08
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https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cedex/documents/papers/2010-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment (2011)
Working Paper: ENDOGENOUS MOVE STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS: THEORY AND EXPERIMENT (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2010-14

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