Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders

Hande Erkut, Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefton ()
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Martin Sefton: University of Nottingham, School of Economics

No 2014-16, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

Keywords: social norms; dictator games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-16

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