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Commitment in Symmetric Contests

Alex Possajennikov ()

Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, School of Economics

Abstract: The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player's payoff for any number of players.

Keywords: contests; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/documents/discussion-papers/08-13.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Commitment in symmetric contests (2009) Downloads
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