Commitment in symmetric contests

Alex Possajennikov ()

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 1, 375-383

Abstract: The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player''s payoff for any number of players.

JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03-23
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I1-P39.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Commitment in Symmetric Contests (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08c70062

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().