Price discrimination in oligopoly with asymmetric firms

Arijit Mukherjee

Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, School of Economics

Abstract: We generalize the analyses of Hazledine (2006, "Price discrimination in Cournot-Nash oligopoly", Economics Letters) and Kutlu (2009, "Price discrimination in Stackelberg competition", Journal of Industrial Economics) with asymmetric cost firms. We show that the main result of Hazledine, which shows that the average revenue is not dependent on the extent of price discrimination, remains under cost asymmetry but at the industry level. However, the main result of Kutlu, which shows that the Stackelberg leader does not price discriminate at all, does not hold under cost asymmetry. Both the leader and the follower discriminate price under cost asymmetry.

Keywords: Cost asymmetry; Cournot competition; Price discrimination; Stackelberg competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/documents/discussion-papers/10-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Price discrimination in oligopoly with asymmetric firms (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:not:notecp:10/04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Nottingham, School of Economics School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().