Price discrimination in oligopoly with asymmetric firms

Arijit Mukherjee

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 4, 2668-2670

Abstract: Kutlu (2009, “Price discrimination in Stackelberg competition”, Journal of Industrial Economics) shows that the Stackelberg leader sells to the highest value consumers and only the Stackelberg follower practises price discrimination. We show that this result is not robust if the marginal cost of the leader is lower than that of the follower. In this situation, both the leader and the follower practise price discrimination.

Keywords: Cost asymmetry; Price discrimination; Stackelberg competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I4-P245.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Price discrimination in oligopoly with asymmetric firms (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00497

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().