How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions

Paul Klemperer

No 2002-W5, Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Keywords: Auctions; Telecommunications; Spectrum Auctions; 3G; UMTS; Bidding. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2001-08-01, Revised 2001-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions (2002)
Working Paper: How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:0205

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