How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions

Paul Klemperer

No 3215, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European ?third generation? (3G, or ?MTS?) mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark.

Keywords: Auctions; Telecommunications; Spectrum auctions; 3g; Umts; Bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (125)

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Journal Article: How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions (2002)
Working Paper: How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions (2001)
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