Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Stratgies for Recruitment and Retention

Margaret Stevens ()

Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: This paper analyses the contract-posting equilibrium in a general equilibrium matching model of the labour market with on-the-job turnover. Privately optimal contracts have a rising wage-tenure profile, even when productivity is constant. The effect is to reduce equilibrium turnover; when jobs differ in productivity, turnover is below the level required for efficient matching of workers to jobs.

Keywords: WORKERS' REPRESENTATION; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w10

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