From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik

Pradeep Dubey and J. Geanakoplos

Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the ShapleyŠShubik trading-post game.

JEL-codes: C72 D40 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/research/papers/2002/02-01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik (2003)
Working Paper: From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:02-01

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