From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik

Pradeep Dubey and John Geanakoplos ()
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John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/john-geanakoplos

No 1360, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Walras equilibrium; Shapley-Shubik trading-posts game; Money (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D40 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2002-04
Note: CFP 1065.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2003), 39: 391-400

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Journal Article: From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik (2003)
Working Paper: From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1360

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