Synthesising good practices in fiscal federalism: Key recommendations from 15 years of country surveys
Sean Dougherty () and
No 28, OECD Economic Policy Papers from OECD Publishing
The design of intergovernmental fiscal relations can help to ensure that tax and spending powers are assigned in a way to promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Decentralisation can enable sub-central governments to provide better public services for households and firms, while it can also make intergovernmental frameworks more complex, harming equity. The challenges of fiscal federalism are multi-faceted and involve difficult trade-offs. This synthesis paper consolidates much of the OECD’s work on fiscal federalism over the past 15 years, with a particular focus on OECD Economic Surveys. The paper identifies a range of good practices on the design of country policies and institutions related strengthening fiscal capacity delineating responsibilities across evels of government and improving intergovernmental co-ordination.
Keywords: fiscal decentralisation; intergovernmental co-ordination; public service delivery; spending; taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H72 H75 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:ecoaab:28-en
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