The regulation of non-compete clauses across OECD countries

Dan Andrews, Tito Boeri, Andrea Garnero, Sindri Engilbertsson, Sara Holttinen and Lorenzo G. Luisetto

No 332, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: Non-compete clauses can protect firms’ legitimate interests such as trade secrets or training investments, but they can also hinder worker mobility, wage growth, and innovation. Therefore, the way these clauses are regulated is central to balancing business needs with labour market dynamism. This paper provides the first cross-country analysis of non-compete regulatory regimes in OECD countries. It documents the main legal dimensions that govern their enforceability, and it develops a new index that captures regulatory strictness and structure. This extends earlier work on the United States. By systematically mapping these frameworks, the paper helps to fill a significant knowledge gap and supports policymakers in evaluating the effectiveness of current regulations in balancing the protection of firms with the fostering of competitive and innovative labour markets.

Keywords: Job Mobility; Non-Compete Clauses; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 J62 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:elsaab:332-en

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