The Influence of Political Pressure Groups on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Achim Hagen, Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and Hans-Peter Weikard
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Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera: Economics Center, World Resources Institute, Washington DC

No V-391-16, Working Papers from University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on the emissions abatement decisions of countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists. We determine the influence of lobby-groups on the abatement decisions of countries. This influence affects members of an international environmental agreement as well as outsiders. However, in the case of agreement members, the effects of lobbying are not restricted to the lobby’s host-country but spill over to other member countries and have ambiguous effects on the agreement stability.

Keywords: interest groups; coalition theory; environmental policy making; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D78 H41 Q28 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2016-08, Revised 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Oldenburg Working Papers V-391-16

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:old:dpaper:391

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