Adaptive Learning and Monetary Policy Design

George Evans and Seppo Honkapohja

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: We review the recent work on interest rate setting, which emphasizes the desireability of designing policy to ensure stability under private agent learning. Appropriately designed expectations based rules can yield optimal rational expectations equilibria that are both determinate and stable under learning. Some simple instrument rules and approximate targeting rules also have these desirable properties. We take up various complications in implementing optimal policy, including the observability of key variables and the required knowledge of structural parameters. An additional issue that we take up concerns the implications of expectation shocks not arising from transitional learning effects.

Keywords: Commitment; interest rate setting; adaptive learning; stability; expectations shocks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D84 E31 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2002-11-08, Revised 2004-03-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-mac
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http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2002-18_Evans_Adaptive_Learning.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Adaptive learning and monetary policy design (2004)
Journal Article: Adaptive learning and monetary policy design (2003)
Working Paper: Adaptive Learning and Monetary Policy Design (2003)
Working Paper: Adaptive learning and monetary policy design (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2002-18

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