Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment

George Evans and Seppo Honkapohja

University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers from University of Oregon Economics Department

Abstract: This is a revised and shortened version of Working Paper 2002-11. Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy. We assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to an RE equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private expectations performs particularly well on both counts.

Keywords: Commitment; interest rate setting; adaptive learning; stability; determinacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D84 E31 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2002-05-27, Revised 2005-04-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Downloads: (external link)
http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2005-11_Evans_Commitment.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment* (2006)
Working Paper: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment (2004)
Working Paper: Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment (2002)
Working Paper: Monetary policy, expectations and commitment (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-11

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