The Value of a Coordination Game

Willemien Kets, Wouter Kager and Alvaro Sandroni

No ymzrd, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.

Date: 2021-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://osf.io/download/60b8c5a89096b7032a643062/

Related works:
Journal Article: The value of a coordination game (2022)
Working Paper: The Value of a Coordination Game (2021)
Working Paper: The Value of the Coordination Game (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:ymzrd

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ymzrd

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