The Value of the Coordination Game

Willemien Kets, Wouter Kager and Alvaro Sandroni

No 938, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare.

Date: 2021-06-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: The value of a coordination game (2022)
Working Paper: The Value of a Coordination Game (2021)
Working Paper: The Value of a Coordination Game (2021)
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