Structural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information
Jason Blevins
No 14-01, Working Papers from Ohio State University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
In models of strategic interaction, there may be important order of entry effects if one player can credibly commit to an action (e.g., entry) before other players. If one estimates a simultaneous-move model, then the move-order effects will be confounded with the payoffs. This paper considers nonparametric identification and simulation-based estimation of sequential games of complete information. Relative to simultaneous-move games, these models avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and require fewer payoff normalizations. We apply the estimator in several Monte Carlo experiments and to study entry-order effects using data from the airline industry.
Keywords: static games; sequential games; identification; simulation-based estimation; airline industry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C15 C35 C57 C72 L13 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 Pages
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ecm, nep-gth and nep-ore
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http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/pdf/blevins/wp14-01.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF COMPLETE INFORMATION (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osu:osuewp:14-01
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