Number of bidders and the winner’s curse

Ronald Peeters and Anastas Tenev ()
Additional contact information
Anastas Tenev: Department of Economics, Maastricht University

No 1802, Working Papers from University of Otago, Department of Economics

Abstract: Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation.

Keywords: Winner’s curse; number of bidders; affiliated value auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2018-01, Revised 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/otago673907.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse (2018)
Working Paper: Number of bidders and the winner's curse (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:otg:wpaper:1802

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Otago, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Janet Bryant ().