Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse

Ronald Peeters and Anastas Tenev

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018, vol. 18, issue 3, 4

Abstract: Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its frequency of occurrence and its expected harm. From a design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage bidder participation.

Keywords: winner’s curse; number of bidders; affiliated value auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Number of bidders and the winner’s curse (2018)
Working Paper: Number of bidders and the winner's curse (2016)
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0025

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