Applying Auction Theory to Economics

Paul Klemperer

No 1, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and standard economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.

Keywords: auctions; bidding; auction theory; private values; common values; mechanism design; litigation; stock markets; queues; financial crashes; brand loyalty; War of Attrition; Bertrand; perfect competition; E-commerce; spectrum auctions; treasury auctions; ele (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D44 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-05-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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