Dynamic Interactive Epistemology

Oliver Board ()

No 125, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker[39] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [6], and used to analyze rational play in extensive form games. But while the properties of Kripke structures are well understood, without a formal language in which belief and belief revision statements can be expressed, it is unclear exactly what are the properties of these dynamic models. Here we investigate this question, by defining such a language. A semantics and syntax are presented, with soundness and completeness theorems linking the two.

Keywords: interactive epistemology; belief revision; semantic; syntactic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f1651a9b-6b46-443f-9f13-ef65fe77832f (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic interactive epistemology (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:125

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).